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OPINION

COWEN, Circuit Judge.
Vanessa Hunter appeals from final orders of the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, which
imposed: (1) two concurrent terms of imprisonment of eighteen
months each, and a three year period of supervised release; and
(2) restitution in an aggregate amount of $75,000 as a condition
of supervised release.

Because the district court properly

applied Guideline Section 3B1.1 in finding that Hunter was a
manager of a criminal conspiracy and subject to a two level
enhancement pursuant to Section 3B1.1(c), we will affirm those
portions of the orders of the district court.

On Hunter's claim

that the district court failed to make the required factual
findings to support its restitution orders, however, we will
reverse and remand.

I.

Nu Skin International of Provo, Utah, markets Nu Skin
skin-care products through a multi-level network of independent
distributors, buying wholesale and selling at a markup.

To

expand its distributor network, the company encourages
sponsorship of new distributors; as new distributors are
recruited, sponsors are promoted to "executive" or "upline"
distributors of the new "downline" distributor.

Nu Skin pays

monthly commissions to upline executives whose downline
distributors attain a target sales volume.
Hunter began selling Nu Skin in the summer of 1990, and
she signed as a downline distributor of Joseph Fanelli.

Hunter

contends that Fanelli assumed total control over Hunter's daily
affairs, including controlling her business matters and personal
checking account.

She maintains that her tolerance of Fanelli's

control was based on her dependent nature and the promise that
Fanelli would make Hunter a successful upline distributor.
Fanelli urged Hunter to locate sources of credit card
account numbers.

Fanelli and Hunter planned to use these account

numbers to purchase Nu Skin products, which they would then sell
on consignment in health centers and hair salons.

Thereafter, in

the late summer or early fall of 1990, Hunter telephoned a
friend, Martin Guzman.

After Guzman said he did not have access

to credit card data, Hunter urged him to recruit as her source
Roel "Roy" Trevino, an employee of the St. Anthony Hotel in San
Antonio, Texas.

Over the following few weeks, Hunter discussed

the matter several times with both Guzman and Trevino, and

offered to pay Trevino for every stolen credit card account
number.
Hunter maintains that she initially believed that
Fanelli would repay Nu Skin as a "loan."

She also contends that

she feared that Fanelli would physically harm her or her family
if she were to disobey him.

According to Hunter, Fanelli even

boasted of his "ties to the mob" as a means of intimidating her.
Throughout the month of October 1990, Trevino
periodically stole credit card data from the St. Anthony Hotel
and read it over the telephone to Hunter.

Ultimately he

compromised the accounts of more than 200 patrons.

Hunter paid

Trevino by arranging for money to be wired to him in San Antonio.
Between October 1990 and December 1991, Hunter, Fanelli, and
others working at their direction, used Visa and Mastercard
account numbers supplied by Trevino and other sources to place
orders for Nu Skin at a total cost in excess of $293,000.

Hunter

and Fanelli caused orders to be shipped to persons who were
willing to hold the shipments until they or any of several
accomplices could pick up the shipments.

In addition, Hunter and

Fanelli caused all fraudulent orders to be made by "distributors"
they sponsored, sometimes creating fictitious distributors by
executing new distributor agreements using aliases.

By placing

orders in the names of distributors purportedly sponsored by
Hunter and Fanelli, they also caused Nu Skin to issue them checks
totalling more than $28,000 for commissions earned on the
fraudulent orders.

Fanelli reaped most of the profits from the scheme.
Hunter became financially dependent on her sister and eventually
was supported by food stamps.

She later declared bankruptcy.

Since November of 1993, however, Hunter has acquired a job at
Fitch Investors in New York where she has continued to work.
The United States filed an information in the District
of New Jersey alleging credit card fraud, contrary to 18 U.S.C. §
1029(a)(2), and filed a superseding information in the Western
District of Texas, alleging conspiracy to traffic in and use
unauthorized access devices, contrary to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(2)
and (b)(2).

Pursuant to Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure, the superseding information from the Western District
of Texas was transferred to the District of New Jersey.
Hunter and the Government reached a negotiated plea
agreement, and she entered her pleas of guilty.

When Hunter re-

appeared before the district court for sentencing, the district
court imposed two concurrent terms of imprisonment, each of
eighteen months, and a three-year period of supervised release.
Restitution was also ordered in the aggregate amount of $75,000
as a condition of the supervised release.

This appeal followed.

II.
Hunter argues that the district court improperly
increased the base offense level by two points upon the erroneous
finding that Hunter was a "manager" or "supervisor," pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c).

The determination of Hunter's aggravating

role in the offense is essentially factual in nature and,

therefore, we will reverse the findings of the district court
only for clear error.

See United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 125,

126-27 (3d Cir. 1989).
Hunter's base offense level was enhanced two levels by
the district court under § 3B1.1(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines
in order to reflect Hunter's role as a manager/supervisor in the
credit card conspiracy.

Section 3B1.1 provides:

Based on the defendant's role in the offense,
increase the offense level as follows:
(a) If the defendant was an organizer or
leader of a criminal activity that involved
five or more participants or was otherwise
extensive, increase by 4 levels.
(b) If the defendant was a manager or
supervisor (but not an organizer or leader)
and the criminal activity involved five or
more participants or was otherwise extensive,
increase by 3 levels.
(c) If the defendant was an organizer,
leader, manager, or supervisor in any
criminal activity other than described in (a)
or (b), increase by 2 levels.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1.
The guideline commentary lists factors that should be
considered by the sentencing court in determining whether to
apply the "aggravating role enhancement": (1) the exercise of
decision making authority; (2) the nature of participation in the
commission of the offense; (3) the recruitment of accomplices;
(4) the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the
crime; (5) the degree of participation in planning or organizing
the offense; (6) the nature and scope of the illegal activity;

and (7) the degree of control and authority exercised over
others.

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, commentary, n.4.

The commentary also

acknowledges that more than one person can qualify as a leader of
a criminal conspiracy, and emphasizes that the aggravating role
enhancement "is included primarily because of concerns about
relative responsibility."

Id. & background.

It is stipulated that the entire loss incurred as a
result of the scheme totalled approximately $321,000.

The

Government does not contest Hunter's assertion that she never
possessed a substantial portion of these sums.

Hunter argues

that the fact that she led a low-income lifestyle is the most
compelling and objective evidence that she was not a
"supervisor."
While it may be true that Hunter's low-income lifestyle
weighs against the "claimed right to a larger share of the fruits
of the crime" factor, we do not believe that considering the
record as a whole, the district court was clearly erroneous in
its decision to give an enhancement.
The district court imposed on Hunter two points, the
lowest enhancement under § 3B1.1. The district court stated:
Because if you look at the record, if you
look at the presentence report, she is up to
her eyeballs here. She recruited Guzman,
Tr[e]vino, she received credit card
information from them and others; she used
credit card data to place orders for N[u]
Skin; she created fictitious distributors;
she signed fraudulent credit card slips
herself . . . .
Because these are all managerial type things,
or at least her role here was clearly
managerial. I mean I suggest that when and

if Mr. Fanelli is convicted, he will get more
than a two point enhancement. He will get at
least a three. Because his role was greater
than hers. But that is not inconsistent with
saying that she too was a manager and
supervisor of Guzman, of Tr[e]vino, for
starters.
App. at 42-43.

The district court also recognized Hunter's

argument that her sentence should not be enhanced because she did
not profit as much as Fanelli, yet nevertheless was persuaded
that based on the facts in the record as a whole, there was
sufficient basis for the two point enhancement.

App. at 48.

We conclude that there was ample support in the record
for the district court's enhancement determination.

As the

district court found, the fact that Hunter did not receive the
bulk of the profits or live a lavish lifestyle as a result of the
crime does not change the analysis of her relative individual
conduct and culpability.

The district court was not clearly

erroneous in concluding that Hunter was a manager or supervisor.
We will affirm the order enhancing Hunter's sentence by two
points.

III.
Hunter also argues that the district court erred in
imposing restitution in the amount of $75,000 by not considering
Hunter's financial resources and ability to pay.

Our review over

whether the district court incorrectly imposed an order of
restitution is bifurcated; plenary review is exercised over
whether the law permits the award, but the particular award is

reviewed for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Furst, 918

F.2d 400, 408 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Pollak, 844
F.2d 145, 152 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d
475, 480 (3d Cir. 1985)).
Title 18, Section 3664(a) of the United States Code
provides:
The court, in determining whether to order
restitution under section 3663 of this title
and the amount of such restitution, shall
consider the amount of the loss sustained by
any victim as a result of the offense, the
financial resources of the defendant, the
financial needs and earning ability of the
defendant and the defendant's dependents, and
such other factors as the court deems
appropriate.
18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1990).

In this regard, the

district court stated at sentencing:
I will impose an order of restitution
consistent with what I believe, from the
records, will be Miss Hunter's future ability
to pay restitution. I recognize she has an
$18,000 restitution judgment that's in
default now with the state, I recognize she's
defaulted on her student loan, I recognize
she's been in bankruptcy. I recognize as
well though that she has the ability to work.
In fact, she is working now and that in the
future, at least over the period of
supervised release, she'll be able to pay
some portion of the restitutionary obligation
that would be due here.
App. at 38-39.
The district court subsequently ordered restitution in
the amount of $75,000 to be paid during the period of supervised
release in installment payments.

The court stated, "[t]his

restitutionary obligation is jointly and severally with those of
her co-defendants."

App. at 59.

We believe that these findings are insufficient for
purposes of determining Hunter's ability to pay restitution.

We

note that a defendant's current indigency is not determinative in
calculating a restitution order.

Congress recognized that

indigency may be temporary and, if necessary, even an indigent
offender may be compelled to pay restitution.

United States v.

Carrara, No. 94-5204, 1995 WL 75853, at *4 (3d Cir. Feb. 27,
1995) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)).

However, the district court

failed to make the necessary factual findings on all factors
bearing on Hunter's current and future ability to pay $75,000 in
restitution.

Based on the admittedly limited record on appeal

before us, we can perceive no reasonable basis for believing that
Hunter will be able to discharge the obligation of restitution
that the district court has ordered.
We recently discussed the purposes of restitution in
Carrara:
Restitution has customarily been awarded to
answer various penological concerns. It is
primarily restorative and is supposed, at
least partially, to replace victims in the
financial position they occupied before the
offense was committed against them. See
generally S.Rep No. 532, 97th Cong.2d Sess.
30, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515,
2536-39. In that sense, restitution is also
remonstrative, and, where indicated, will
require that offenders disgorge their
illgotten gains. United States v. Woods, 986
F.2d 669, 678-81 (3d Cir. 1993). Then too,
restitution is rehabilitative because it
permits or indeed requires that offenders
personally face what they have done and, at

least partially, atone for their legal
transgressions by direct action in the form
of a positive personal performance. Congress
requires, however, that when restitution is
indicated the district court consider both
the loss sustained by the victim and the
offender's financial resources, financial
needs, and present and potential earning
ability. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a).
1995 WL 75853, at *3 (footnotes omitted).
We have consistently required district courts "`to make
specific findings as to the factual issues that are relevant to
the application of the restitution provisions of the [Victim and
Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-3580 (1982)].'" United
States v. Logar, 975 F.2d 958, 961 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Palma,
760 F.2d at 480).

While it is certainly appropriate for a

district court to consider a defendant's ability to earn income
in the future, restitution is only appropriate in an amount that
the defendant can realistically be expected to pay.

Logar, 975

F.2d at 964.
The district court erred by relying solely on its
conclusory statement that, "she is working now and that in the
future, at least over the period of supervised release, she'll be
able to pay some portion of the restitutionary obligation that
would be due her."

App. at 39.

support the restitution order.

This finding does not adequately
We can foresee no possibility on

the facts in the record that Hunter will be able to make the
$75,000 restitution payments during the three years of supervised
release, given Hunter's salary and reasonable expenses.1
1

While

. The presentence investigation report provides a summary of
Hunter's financial condition. The district court adopted the

it is true, as the Government argues, that a district court may
"aim high" in calculating a restitution order, the amount of
$75,000 appears to be unfounded in light of Hunter's limited
resources and future ability to pay.2
We next discuss the significance of the district
court's statement that "[t]his restitutionary obligation is
jointly and severally with those of her co-defendants."
59.

App. at

It is not clear from the record whether the district court

intended for Hunter to be individually responsible for the
$75,000 restitution, or whether Hunter was jointly and severally
liable with the other defendants.

We note that Guzman had been

(..continued)
factual findings in the presentence report. App. at 66, 72. The
report states that on April 9, 1994, Hunter provided the
probation office with a personal financial statement that
reflects that she has no assets other than personal furniture and
clothing. Her debts include a delinquent college loan amounting
to $3,125 and restitution of $18,000 ordered by the Middlesex
County Superior Court. A review of Hunter's credit report by the
probation office verified the delinquent student loan. Hunter
does not have any other history of credit cards, lines of credit
or financial history because all of her previous debts were
cleared by a bankruptcy order. Hunter filed for personal
voluntary bankruptcy under Chapter Seven of the Bankruptcy Code.
The debt listed on the bankruptcy application amounted to
approximately $15,000. Hunter's net salary per month is $1,806.
Her necessary monthly living expenses for rent, food, utilities,
telephone and restitution amount to $1,210. The report concludes
that Hunter has a positive monthly cash flow of approximately
$600. Nothing in this record would indicate that she has
additional resources or other ability to discharge the obligation
of restitution.
2

. We do not mean to suggest that a district court must conduct
a full-blown evidentiary hearing and make such precise findings
regarding a defendant's income and expenses as often occurs in
matrimonial litigation. However, we must insist that in crafting
the ultimate restitution order, the district court consider the
reasonable expectation of payment.

sentenced to $7,000 in restitution, and we cannot comprehend on
this record joint and several liability where the amount of
restitution ordered for each defendant is different.

We do not

mean to imply that joint and several liability is improper as a
matter of law or inappropriate under the facts of this case.3

We

agree with well-settled law that the state's interests in justice
and rehabilitation should allow a district court the discretion
to impose joint and several liability on multiple defendants.
See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 7 F.3d 1537, 1540 (10th Cir.
1993); United States v. Chaney, 964 F.2d 437, 453-54 (5th Cir.
1992); United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d 424, 435 (9th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042, 108 S. Ct. 773 (1988);
United States v. Tzakis, 736 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1984).

Nor

does the joint and several liability necessarily have to mirror
the precise culpability of each co-defendant when imposing
restitution.

See, e.g., United States v. Hand, 863 F.2d 1100,

1106 (3d Cir. 1988) (in ordering restitution, the fact that
burden of restitution laid entirely on one co-defendant where two
co-defendants were equally culpable did not offend the
Constitution and "certainly, did not constitute an abuse of
discretion").
3

. We do not foreclose that in fine-tuning orders of restitution
among co-defendants with varying degrees of culpability in
criminal conduct, a resourceful district court could fashion an
order of restitution based on credit to be given to one defendant
for the restitution paid by co-defendant, and other similar
refinements. If a complicated case calls for an imaginative
restitution scheme, we merely observe that the discretion of a
district court in these matters is broad, so long as the district
court comports with 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) and the principles
announced by this Court.

However, even if the restitution order were joint and
several, the district court must nevertheless make specific
findings on whether Hunter will realistically be able to pay the
full restitution amount.

Accordingly, we will remand this matter

to the district court to take evidence and make findings as to
the amount of restitution that Hunter can realistically be
expected to pay.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district
court enhancing Hunter's sentence by two points as a
manager/supervisor will be affirmed.

However, because the record

does not adequately support the order of the district court
setting restitution in the amount of $75,000, we will reverse and
remand with instructions to hear evidence, make factual findings,
and enter a new order in an amount appropriate and consistent
with this opinion.

